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In Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation,' Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch looks at leadership counsel in multidistrict litigation ("MDL")
through the lens of repeat-player power and monopolization. She shows
that a small number of lawyers dominate the market for membership
on plaintiff steering committees and for lead counsel, liaison counsel,
and other leadership roles. The dominance of these repeat players, she
explains, allows them to fashion approaches that benefit themselves
and each other in one MDL after another. To demonstrate that
monopoly power benefits "producers" (MDL leadership counsel) and
harms "consumers" (individual plaintiffs), Burch points to particular
types of settlement terms that these lawyers routinely insert in the
deals they negotiate. These settlement provisions, she argues, offer
advantages to leadership counsel and to defendants rather than to the
plaintiffs whose interests the lawyers purportedly represent. Burch's
powerful article-which refuses to accept the status quo and refuses to
bow to powerful forces on all sides of mass litigation-makes an
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1. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67
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important contribution by offering a fresh perspective on threats to
justice in the current MDL system of mass dispute resolution. 2
In laying out her argument about lawyer monopolies in MDL,
Burch draws a sharp contrast between MDL and class actions.
"[W]ithout certification," Burch writes, "multidistrict proceedings lack
the judicial, competitive-market, and institutional checks that can help
safeguard and legitimize class outcomes." 3 As to judicial checks, she
points out the procedural safeguards built into the class action process.
Among other things, class actions require a certification of
cohesiveness, 4 judicial approval of settlement,5 and a right to opt out of
money-damages class actions.6 Burch emphasizes that MDL transferee
judges, when appointing MDL lead lawyers, are not bound by an
adequate-representation requirement.7 As to competitive -market
checks, she explains that the distinctive processes of class counsel fee
awards and class members' opt-out rights encourage competition. "In
Rule 23(b)(3) classes," she writes, "because only class counsel stand to
gain attorneys' fees, a host of competing attorneys who are otherwise
boxed out of that fee award have incentives to solicit and assist class
members in opting out. Appellate courts stand ready to reverse
collusive deals and chastise self-dealing attorneys." 8 In contrast to class
actions, Burch worries, "these safeguards crumble in non-class,
multidistrict proceedings."9
2. Importantly, Burch recognizes that MDL functions in many cases as a system of mass
dispute resolution, not merely as a system of pretrial processing. The MDL statute holds out the
bland appearance of a venue transfer provision that authorizes transfer of actions to a single
federal district court for pretrial handling, with instructions to remand the actions to their original
courts for trial after the conclusion of coordinated discovery and other pretrial matters. See 28
U.S.C. § 1407. In reality, as Burch understands, MDL is not mostly about processing cases for trial
in the transferor courts. Disputes often are resolved on a wholesale basis by comprehensive
settlements negotiated by MDL committee lawyers under the supervision and encouragement of
MDL transferee judges. Much of what happens in MDL-discovery, pretrial motion practice,
bellwether trials, mediation-is aimed at bringing out the information lawyers and parties need
for a comprehensive negotiated resolution. See Burch, supra note 1, at 72 (noting that only 2.9%
of MDL actions are remanded to their original districts); see also Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore
Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (framing the MDL judge's role in terms of generating information so that the
parties can negotiate appropriate resolutions).
3. Burch, supra note 1, at 71.
4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)-(4), 23(b).
5. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
6. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
7. Burch, supra note 1, at 71. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (adequate representation as a
requirement for class certification); Hansberryv. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (adequate representation
as a constitutional due process requirement for the binding effect of a class action judgment).
8. Burch, supra note 1, at 71.
9. Id.
MDL AND CLASS ACTIONS
Burch makes a persuasive argument about the risks of small-
group power in MDL, but in so doing, she overstates the contrast
between MDL and class actions. Rather than emphasizing what is
different between the two, I suggest that there is value in thinking
about the problem she describes as one that occurs, in slightly different
ways, in both of these types of aggregate litigation. In the MDL setting,
Burch offers strong evidence of a repeat-player phenomenon in counsel
selection, presents a convincing account of settlement terms that serve
the interests of the repeat-player attorneys, and draws a plausible
connection between the two. MDL leadership lawyers' ability to
monopolize global settlement negotiations somewhat explains self-
serving settlement terms, and the cartel of repeat-player lawyers
further explains "why non-lead attorneys (particularly those playing
the long game) do not object."10
The parallels between MDL and class actions relate both to the
problem Burch describes and to the solutions Burch offers. The problem
of lawyers' monopoly power to negotiate resolutions on behalf of large
numbers of claimants is structurally similar in both settings but
manifests itself differently. That is, the particular settlement terms
that lawyers use in non-class MDL settlements differ somewhat from
the terms that lawyers use in class settlements, but in both contexts,
settlement terms are self-serving in similar ways. As to potential
solutions, despite differences in the power of an MDL transferee judge
and the power of a class action judge, judicial safeguards play a critical
role in each setting.
I.WHAT MDL AND CLASS ACTIONS HAVE IN COMMON
A. Problems of Settlement Monopoly Power
"Leaders face systematic temptations at multiple points to serve
themselves and act disloyally toward plaintiffs," Burch writes." She
articulates the dangers that arise when a small group of MDL lawyers
controls the negotiation of a settlement that could resolve the claims of
thousands of claimants. The lead plaintiffs' lawyers face temptations to
strike deals that will bring money into the fund from which their
common benefit fees will be paid and to include terms that will
maximize the comprehensiveness of the resolution, even if the terms
disserve the interests of some of the claimants. 12 They have the
10. Id. at 89.
11. Id. at 125.
12. Of the closure provisions Burch includes in her discussion, some are more problematic
than others. Walkaway provisions and case census provisions, for example, can be effective means
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opportunity to accomplish this because their fee incentives align, in
important respects, with the interests of the defendant.
In this regard, MDL non-class settlement negotiations
powerfully resemble the negotiation of settlement class actions. A
settlement class action, also known as a settlement-only class action, is
a class action certified solely for the purpose of turning a negotiated
resolution into a court judgment that binds an entire class. While MDL
mass, non-class settlement negotiations look in certain ways like every
class settlement negotiation, they bear the strongest resemblance to
such settlement class actions. Lawyers who represent particular
plaintiffs (whether as litigants in the MDL or as putative class
representatives) attempt to strike deals with defendants not only on
behalf of the lawyers' individual clients, but also on behalf of the entire
group of similarly situated claimants. These lawyers know that if they
succeed in striking a deal to resolve the claims of the entire group, they
stand to be richly compensated. However, if they fail to strike a deal-
that is, if they refuse to agree to terms that appeal to the defendant-
they stand to lose a significant portion of their fees. In the case of a
settlement class action, would-be class counsel must strike a deal that
satisfies the defendant or else risk losing the class action franchise. 13
This is because, in a settlement class action, the class has not been
certified to go to trial. In the case of an MDL non-class settlement
negotiated by lead lawyers, striking a wholesale deal with the
defendant enhances both the certainty and the amount of the common
benefit fees to be awarded to the negotiating lawyers.
In her article, Burch catalogues MDL settlement terms that
serve the interests of defendants and lead plaintiffs' lawyers rather
than the interests of individual claimants. 14 In Aggregation as
Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, I undertook a
similar cataloguing of class settlement terms that serve the aligned
interests of defendants and class counsel rather than the interests of
of assuring sufficient peace for defendants while leaving plaintiffs with an opportunity to make
individual decisions about whether to accept or reject the offered terms. As the required
participation rate approaches one hundred percent, however, such provisions become increasingly
coercive and may encourage unethical conduct by lawyers angling to ensure that every client says
yes. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KANSAS L. REV.
979 (2010). Mandatory recommendation and withdrawal terms likewise put lawyers in the
ethically troubling position of pushing for every client to say yes for the sake of a comprehensive
deal rather than delivering loyal representation to each client. See Howard M. Erichson &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011). For a useful
discussion of settlement terms that bring closure in both troubling and less troubling ways, see D.
Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
13. See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
951 (2014).
14. See Burch, supra note 1, at 124-55.
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class members. 15 The reason to create such a compendium of settlement
terms is two-fold. First, the catalogue may alert judges to problematic
settlement features, thus facilitating judicial protection of claimants.
Second, the catalogue may be the best way to illustrate the problem of
self-serving conduct by lawyers negotiating mass settlements. One
cannot demonstrate systematically the unfairness of mass settlements
by looking simply at dollar amounts of settlements. This is because, in
the absence of any baseline for determining the "real value" of
unadjudicated claims and in the face of infinite variability in the legal,
factual, procedural, and tactical strengths of claims, the dollar amounts
of particular settlements do not reveal whether negotiating lawyers
served their own interests at the expense of the interests of individual
claimants. Certain kinds of settlement terms, however, suggest self-
serving behavior by lawyers because the terms add little or no value for
claimants yet serve the aligned interests of the negotiating lawyers and
defendants. This is where Burch focuses her attention with regard to
MDL settlements, and this is where I focused my attention with regard
to class action settlements.
The problem of settlement terms driven by attorney self-interest
is structurally similar in both types of aggregate litigation. In the MDL
setting, Burch points to settlement features that expand the number of
claimants encompassed by the deal, shrink the overall cost for the
defendant, discourage objections, and expand the common benefit fees
for the lead plaintiffs' lawyers.16 In the class action setting, I point to
similar settlement features that exaggerate value, expand the number
of claimants encompassed by the deal, discourage objections, and
maximize class counsel fees.17 In MDL settlements, Burch points to
recommendation, withdrawal, walkaway, case-census, reverter, and fee
provisions. In class settlements, I point to spurious injunctive relief,
coupons, cy pres, claims procedures, reversions, class definitions, class
representative bonuses, revertible fee funds, and clear sailing
agreements. The specifics differ, but the structure of the problem-and
the devices that negotiating lawyers use to serve their own interests-
are remarkably similar.
Burch correctly sees this as a principal-agent problem. She
writes that "transactions may have become too efficient, without
sufficient safeguards to ensure that the efficiencies further principals'-
not agents'-collective interests."18  In both class settlement
15. Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action
Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859 (2016).
16. See Burch, supra note 1, at 124-55.
17. Erichson, supra note 15, at 873-903.
18. Burch, supra note 1, at 86.
2017] 33
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
negotiations and MDL global settlement negotiations, the negotiators
for the plaintiffs are agents neither selected nor controlled by the
principals. Burch recognizes that a client's inability to choose its own
advocate constitutes a structural similarity between class actions and
MDL: "[n]either clients nor their attorneys freely consent to
multidistrict litigation or the subsequent selection of lead counsel....
This non-voluntary aspect makes selecting lead lawyers akin to
appointing class counsel."19 It is worth noting that the problem in MDL
takes on even greater significance because the principal-agent
relationship itself is shaky. MDL lead lawyers have at best an indirect
and ambiguous principal-agent relationship with plaintiffs who are not
the clients of the lead lawyers. In this regard, the position of MDL
leadership counsel differs from the role of class counsel in class actions
certified for litigation, 20 although it is similar to the position of would-
be class counsel attempting to negotiate a settlement class action. 21
B. Safeguards against Abuse of Settlement Monopoly Power
Faced with a structurally similar problem, MDL and class
actions employ different safeguards against problematic mass
settlements. Where class actions rely primarily on formal judicial
safeguards, MDL non-class settlements rely primarily on disclosure
and consent. Even so, these safeguards overlap more than may appear
at first glance.
The first safeguard is careful selection of lawyers to bear the
responsibility and power of working on behalf of the entire group.
Contrasting MDL's open-textured approach to appointment of
leadership positions with the class action rule's explicit requirement of
adequate representation and provisions regarding appointment of class
counsel, Burch suggests that this difference sets MDL apart from class
actions: "[w]hen transferee judges select lead lawyers, they rarely
attend to adequate representation, focusing instead on financial means,
expertise, and cooperation-factors that empower repeat players but
may stifle competition." 22 However, I wonder whether this difference is
more formal than real. MDL judges care about the financial resources
19. Burch, supra note 1, at 125.
20. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4) (making explicit that class counsel's duty runs to the class as
a whole).
21. When MDL lead lawyers seek a global settlement with a defendant on behalf of a mass
of claimants despite the lack of power to litigate those claims to resolution, they especially
resemble lawyers appointed as interim class counsel for purposes of negotiating a settlement on
behalf of a putative class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3) (permitting appointment of interim class
counsel).
22. Burch, supra note 1, at 71.
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of lead lawyers, but so do class action judges. As a practical matter, a
lawyer's resources may be essential to adequate representation in both
types of aggregate litigation. Expertise similarly matters to adequate
representation in both types of litigation. Although cooperation likely
plays a larger role in MDL than in class action appointments, the ability
to work with others may advance the cause in both settings. The ability
to "play well with others" surely offers upsides for accomplishing high
quality work, even as it also presents the cartel problems that Burch
identifies.
Another safeguard is judicial review of settlements. Rule 23
builds such review into class action procedure as a condition for any
negotiated class action resolution to bind the class.2 3 The MDL statute
does no such thing. Burch writes that, "unlike class settlements that
require judges to ensure that they are fair, reasonable, and adequate,
judges have little say in 'private' global deals that leaders design." 2 4 She
is correct that unlike class action judges, MDL transferee judges lack
the power to reject negotiated non-class resolutions that the litigants
choose to accept. On this reasoning, I have sometimes criticized MDL
judges for claiming the power to "approve" or "reject" non-class
settlements. 25 Recently, however, Andrew Bradt and D. Theodore Rave
offered a compelling way to conceptualize the judge's role with regard
to non-class settlements in MDL.26 Even though the judge lacks any
formal legal power to decide whether a non-class settlement should be
given binding effect, the judge nonetheless is well-positioned to opine
on the fairness of a settlement as a way to provide information to the
claimants as they decide whether to participate in the proposed deal. 2 7
Thus, despite differences in the formal powers of judges over different
types of settlements, it goes too far to declare that judges have "little
say" over non-class settlements in MDL. In terms of the safeguards of
judicial appointment of counsel and judicial review of settlement, the
similarities between MDL and class actions are as important as the
differences.
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
24. Burch, supra note 1, at 71.
25. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1015 (2013).
26. Bradt & Rave, supra note 2.
27. See id.
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II. WHAT MDL AND CLASS ACTIONS DO NOT HAVE IN COMMON
Despite the structural similarity between monopoly power over
MDL settlements and monopoly power over class action settlements,
there are important differences in the particulars.
Class actions, as Burch points out, offer formal judicial-
procedural safeguards that exist only informally in MDL. Whereas
MDL judges may weigh in on settlements as a matter of discretion and
as a source of information to the settling parties, 28 the class action rule
builds in a formal requirement: it demands that judges provide notice,
hold a hearing, and make findings of fairness and adequacy as a
prerequisite to the binding effect of any class settlement.29 Whereas
MDL judges may consider the adequacy of lawyers appointed to
leadership positions, the class action rule again builds in a formal
requirement: it allows class certification only after a judicial finding of
adequate representation, 30 which is also a necessary condition for any
class action settlement or judgment to have a binding effect. 31
I share some of Burch's concerns that MDL settlements put
claimants in a position akin to that of absent class members but without
the same formal protections. More than a decade ago, I wrote the
following on the difference between class and non-class proceedings in
the wake of the Supreme Court's rejection of a pair of asbestos
settlement class actions:
Indeed, one irony of Amchem and Ortiz is that the Supreme Court was so protective of the
interests of mass tort plaintiffs, so concerned that absent class members would not be
treated fairly, that as a practical matter it sent most mass tort plaintiffs into non-class
collective representation where they are treated much like absent class members but
without the safeguards of class action procedure. 3 2
But even in the absence of formally equivalent structures, MDL judges
for mass disputes play an increasingly similar role to that of class action
judges.
Also, it is worth remembering that the reason for the additional
formal safeguards in class actions is that class actions bind non-parties,
while MDL adjudications bind only those who are parties to lawsuits
that have been transferred to the MDL, and MDL non-class settlements
bind only those who affirmatively consent to the settlement after proper
28. See id.
29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
30. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
31. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516
U.S. 367 (1996).
32. Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769,
1774 (2005).
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disclosure. For the most part, parties bound by MDL judgments and
settlements are those who have hired lawyers and filed lawsuits. Class
action judgments and settlements, by contrast, bind all those who fall
within a certified class and who did not opt out. The power to bind non-
parties makes runaway class lawyers more dangerous than runaway
MDL lead lawyers. The opportunity to bind claimants to a deal, despite
their lack of consent, is precisely what makes settlement class actions
so appealing to defendants and to putative class counsel.
In other words, rather than thinking of class actions and MDL
in terms of greater and lesser safeguards, it makes more sense to think
of them as encompassing different safeguards. Class actions, because
they bind non-parties, emphasize formal judicial safeguards such as
class certification, formal appointment of class counsel, and formal
review of proposed settlements. MDL non-class settlements, because
they bind only affirmative settlement participants, offer the protection
of client consent backed by lawyers' ethical responsibility of
disclosure. 33 Thus, even as Burch calls attention to the dangers of MDL
settlements and the absence of formal procedural safeguards in MDL,
it is important not to lose sight of the parallel problems in class actions
where, despite safeguards, the risks remain significant.
But perhaps the most important distinction between class
actions and MDL is one that underscores the significance of Burch's
argument. Unlike MDL, class certification relies on a finding of class
cohesion sufficient to permit classwide adjudication. Leaving aside the
problem of settlement class actions, class certification empowers class
counsel and class representatives to litigate their claims collectively at
trial, and thus to negotiate in the shadow of such potential adjudication.
The class certification process focuses the court's attention on whether
the class claims are cohesive enough to permit classwide adjudication.
A case proceeds as a class action only if its proponents show that the
claims meet the requirements of commonality, typicality, adequacy of
representation, and-for money damages class actions under Rule
23(b)(3)-predominance of common issues over individual issues. 34
When a judge finds such cohesion and certifies a class for purposes of
litigation, the class and its lawyer obtain the settlement leverage that
results from the empowerment to achieve classwide adjudication. Thus,
when a settlement deal is struck after a court has certified a class for
33. See ABA Model Rule of Prof. Conduct 1.8(g).
34. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)-(4), 23(b)(3); Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)
(rejecting a Rule 23(b)(2) employment discrimination class action in part for lack of commonality);
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (rejecting a Rule 23(b)(3) asbestos settlement class
action in part for lack of class cohesion).
2017] 37
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
purposes of litigation, there is reason to be somewhat less skeptical
about whether the deal reflects real leverage on behalf of the plaintiffs.
MDL neither demands such cohesion nor provides claimants the
right to a collective adjudication. The MDL statute combines the
language of venue transfer 35 with the language of consolidation. 36
Rather emphatically, it is neither a joinder provision 37 nor a provision
for representative litigation. 38 Although it creates a setting that
facilitates the negotiation of collective resolutions, MDL is not designed
with collective adjudication in mind.
In the end, the difference between MDL and class actions is not
about the risk that individual claimants might get the short end of the
stick while the lawyers make out like bandits. That risk exists in both
MDL and class actions. Nor is the difference that the judge has a large
role to play in one but not the other. In both MDL and class actions, the
judge plays an important role in protecting against unfair settlements.
But in terms of empowerment, class actions-when certified for
purposes of litigation-offer an upside that MDL does not match, which
is the power of the lead lawyers to pursue collective adjudication on
behalf of the entire group of claimants. Because MDL is theoretically a
more modest form of aggregation, it appropriately lacks a finding of
sufficient cohesion to permit representative litigation and adjudication.
And without the power to pursue claims to collective adjudication, MDL
lead lawyers lack the leverage that lawyers have in litigation class
actions.
Burch identifies important problems in how MDL resolves mass
disputes. She sets up the problem as a contrast to class actions, which
as a formal matter have stronger judicial and procedural safeguards
than MDL. I have suggested here that class actions can be viewed as
raising a parallel set of problems to the ones Burch discusses. Although
class actions and MDL differ in significant ways, these differences
cannot be reduced to a story of monitored class counsel versus
unmonitored MDL counsel. Rather, the similarities between MDL and
class actions run deep, and the differences between them cut in multiple
directions as they relate to the problem of self-serving lawyer conduct
and inadequate resolutions for claimants.
35. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407, with 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (venue transfer).
36. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407, with Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (consolidation).
37. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407, with Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder), and Fed. R. Civ.
P. 19 (compulsory joinder).
38. Compare 28 U.S.C § 1407, with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (class action).
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